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Looming over any discussion of the reporter's privilege is Branzburg
v. Hayes,' a 1972 opinion of the United States Supreme Court. That decision
involved three cases in which journalists who were or may have been eye-
witnesses to criminal activity refused to appear and testify before grand ju-
ries about what they heard and saw.2 Branzburg was a five to four decision,
and the jurisprudence that has developed since it was issued has been influ-
enced by the concurring opinion of Justice Lewis Powell, the swing vote on
the Court, and by the robust dissenting opinion of Justice Potter Stewart.3
The majority opinion by Justice Byron White held that the freedom of
speech and press guaranteed by the First Amendment was not abridged by
requiring the newsmen to appear and testify before state and federal grand
juries.' In two of the cases, the newsmen wrote about criminal activity that
they had witnessed,5 and in the third case, the newsman may have witnessed
or heard about criminal activity but had not written about it.6
This article will (1) review the Arkansas Shield Statute and the two
cases construing it,7 (2) consider the legacy of Branzburg and the impact of
a recent case that challenges the reading given to the opinion during the past
thirty-two years by federal and state appellate courts,8 and (3) review deci-
sions of state and federal courts of original jurisdiction in Arkansas on the
issue of a reporter's privilege.9 All of this will lead to the conclusion that the
* Member, Williams & Anderson, PLC, Little Rock; president, American Bar Asso-
ciation, 1998-1999. The author gratefully acknowledges the assistance of Bonnie Johnson,
also of Williams & Anderson, in preparing this article for publication, as well as the valuable
contributions of student clerks Joi Leonard of the William H. Bowen School of Law, Univer-
sity of Arkansas at Little Rock, and T.J. Fowler of the School of Law, University of Arkan-
sas, Fayetteville.
1. 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
2. Id. at 667-79.
3. Justice William 0. Douglas filed a separate dissenting opinion in favor of an abso-
lute privilege. United States v. Caldwell, 408 U.S. 665, 712 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
4. Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 691.
5. Id. at 667-75.
6. Id. at 675.
7. See infra Part II.
8. See infra Part Ill.
9. See infra Part IV.
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majority of state and federal decisions in the United States since the
Branzburg decision got it right. There is a constitutional concept broader
than the protection of reporters that is at stake. It is the protection of the
public.' °
II. THE ARKANSAS SHIELD STATUTE
Branzburg was concerned only with grand jury subpoenas in criminal
cases. 1 In Arkansas, however, there is a reporter's shield statute that affords
protection in both criminal and civil proceedings. 2 That statute does not
apply in federal-question proceedings.' 3 The Arkansas Supreme Court has
recognized the privilege that the shield statute affords to journalists.14
The Arkansas Shield Statute was adopted in 1936 as part of a package
of criminal reform provisions in an initiated act sponsored by the Arkansas
Bar Association. 5 The statute reads as follows:
Before any editor, reporter, or other writer for any newspaper, periodical,
or radio station, or publisher of any newspaper or periodical or manager
or owner of any radio station shall be required to disclose to any grand
jury or to any other authority the source of information used as the basis
for any article he may have written, published, or broadcast, it must be
shown that the article was written, published, or broadcast in bad faith,
with malice, and not in the interests of the public welfare.'
6
The statute has been amended only once, in 1949, to add references to ra-
dio. 7
There have been only two reported opinions construing the shield stat-
ute.' 8 The first was a 1978 opinion of the Arkansas Supreme Court, Saxton
v. Arkansas Gazette Co.' 9 It was a libel suit against the newspaper and its
reporter.20 During the course of discovery, the plaintiff sought to determine
10. See infra Part V.
11. Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 667.
12. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-85-510 (West 2004).
13. United States v. Hively, 202 F. Supp. 2d 886 (E.D. Ark. 2002); In re Grand Jury
Subpoena Am. Broad. Co., 947 F. Supp. 1314, 1321 (E.D. Ark. 1996).
14. Saxton v. Ark. Gazette Co., 264 Ark. 133, 569 S.W.2d 115 (1978).
15. The origins of this statute are described in detail in a magisterial article by Professor
John J. Watkins entitled The Journalist's Privilege in Arkansas, 7 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L.J.
473 (1984).
16. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-85-510 (West 2004).
17. Act of Mar. 8, 1949, No. 254, 1949 Ark. Acts 761 (codified at ARK. CODE ANN. §
16-85-5 10 (West 2004)).
18. Williams v. Am. Broad. Co., 96 F.R.D. 658 (W.D. Ark. 1983); Saxton, 264 Ark.
133,569 S.W.2d 115.
19. 264 Ark. 133,569 S.W.2d 115 (1978).
20. Id. at 134, 569 S.W.2d at 116.
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the identity of the source of information appearing in articles written by the
reporter and published in the newspaper.2 The reporter refused to reveal her
source and claimed the reporter's privilege.22 The plaintiff moved to compel
discovery, and the trial court found that the plaintiff "had not made reason-
able efforts by deposition or other means to learn the identity of the infor-
mant nor reasonable efforts to show publication with malice, bad faith, and
reckless disregard" of whether the publications were false or not.2 3 The court
also held that disclosure of the source was privileged pursuant to the shield
statute. 24 The newspaper and reporter moved for summary judgment, which
was granted in the absence of any further proof by the plaintiff.
25
On appeal, the plaintiff cited Branzburg v. Hayes for reversal.26 The
Arkansas Supreme Court distinguished Branzburg and other cases cited by
the plaintiff because they all involved the assertion that a reporter has an
absolute privilege under the First Amendment, and those cases did not in-
volve a statutory privilege for news reporters. 27 The court held that, even
though the shield statute had been codified with criminal statutes, it also
applied to civil cases.28 The court further held that the reporter did not waive
whatever privilege she had by telling her editor and the deputy prosecuting
attorney the name of the person she thought to be her anonymous source.2 9
Even though Saxton is the only Arkansas Supreme Court case citing the
statute, it resolved important issues regarding its reach and application. 0
In a 1978 opinion from the United States District Court for the Western
District of Arkansas, Williams v. American Broadcasting Co., ' Judge
Franklin Waters held that the shield statute did not protect outtakes (the un-
used footage of edited videotaped reports).32 The court, while acknowledg-
ing that the Arkansas Supreme Court had been "zealous in the protection of
21. Id., 569 S.W.2d at 116.
22. Id., 569 S.W.2d at 116.
23. Id., 569 S.W.2d at 116.
24. Id., 569 S.W.2d at 116.
25. Saxton, 264 Ark. at 134, 569 S.W.2d at 116.
26. Id. at 135, 569 S.W.2d at 116.
27. Id., 569 S.W.2d at 116.
28. Id. at 136, 569 S.W.2dat 117.
29. Id., 569 S.W.2d at 117.
30. Judge George Howard, Jr., now an active United States District Judge, was a justice
of the Arkansas Supreme Court at the time of the Saxton opinion, and he wrote a concurring
opinion stating that he based his vote to affirm "on the belief that the First and Fourteenth
Amendments to the United States Constitution afford a greater protection to the press and
citizens to criticize and comment freely on the manner in which public officials perform their
public stewardship." Id. at 140, 569 S.W.2d at 119 (Howard, J., concurring). He also said that
it was his view "that the privilege to criticize public officials' conduct, despite the possible
harm that might develop, is unconditional and absolute." Id., 569 S.W.2d at 119.
31. 96 F.R.D. 658 (W.D. Ark. 1983).
32. Id. at 665.
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the rights of the press, 33 held that Arkansas law required a strict construc-
tion of the statute because it was at variance with the common law.34 There-
fore, the court held that the plain wording of the statute protected only the
"source of information" and did not extend to outtakes. 35 After invoking the
principle of strict construction for this statute, the court also found that the
shield statute applied to television journalists in spite of the fact that the
statute mentions only newspapers, periodicals, and radio stations, and the
Arkansas General Assembly had not seen fit to add the medium of television
to the statute during the thirty-four years following the amendment to add
radio journalists to its coverage.36 That ruling can be justified, but not under
the rubric of strict construction.
The court's finding that references in the statute to radio stations per-
mitted the court to construe the statute to apply to television stations is a
liberal construction by any measure. Having referred to the Arkansas Su-
preme Court's zeal "in the protection of the rights of the press,"37 the court
was justified in applying a liberal construction to the statute's language.
Also, the Arkansas Freedom of Information Act,38 which codifies a concept
not recognized by the common law, is given a liberal interpretation by the
Arkansas Supreme Court in order to achieve the beneficial public purposes
that the Act was designed to accomplish.39 That is a remedial statute, of
course, but so is the shield statute, and it is entitled to a liberal construction
to achieve its purposes, too.
III. BRANZBURG AND THE COURTS
The Supreme Court's decision in Branzburg did not go beyond the is-
sue of whether the guarantees of freedom of speech and press in the First
Amendment permit a journalist to decline to appear and testify before a
grand jury in a criminal proceeding.4" The Court held that they do not.4 Jus-
tice Powell, the swing vote, in a concurring opinion, pointedly expressed
what the majority opinion did not do.42 He wrote:




37. Williams, 96 F.R.D. at 665.
38. ARK. CODE ANN. § 25-19-101-09 (West 2006).
39. See, e.g., Harris v. City of Fort Smith, No. Civil 2002-975(V), 2006 WL 1174478
(Ark. May 4, 2006).
40. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 689-90 (1972).
41. Id.
42. Id. at 709 (Powell, J., concurring).
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I add this brief statement to emphasize what seems to me to be the lim-
ited nature of the Court's holding. The Court does not hold that news-
men, subpoenaed to testify before a grand jury, are without constitutional
rights with respect to the gathering of news or in safeguarding their
sources.
43
He went on to say that the Court did not hold "that state and federal authori-
ties are free to 'annex' the news media as 'an investigative arm of govern-
ment.'"' His concurring opinion continued:
Indeed, if the newsman is called upon to give information bearing only a
remote and tenuous relationship to the subject of the investigation, or if
he has some other reason to believe that his testimony implicates confi-
dential source relationships without a legitimate need of law enforce-
ment, he will have access to the court on a motion to quash and an ap-
propriate protective order may be entered. The asserted claim to privi-
lege should be judged on its facts by the striking of a proper balance be-
tween freedom of the press and the obligation of all citizens to give rele-
vant testimony with respect to the criminal conduct. The balance of these
vital constitutional and societal interests on a case-by-case basis accords
with the tried and traditional way of adjudicating such questions.
In short, the courts will be available to newsmen under circumstances
where legitimate First Amendment interests require protection.a
In the opinion for three of the four dissenting justices, Justice Stewart
proposed a three-part test to be applied when a reporter is asked to appear
before a grand jury and reveal confidences.46 Before the confidences could
be revealed, Justice Stewart's test would require that the government (1)
show that there is probable cause to believe that the newsman has informa-
tion that is clearly relevant to a specific probable violation of law, (2) dem-
onstrate that the information sought cannot be obtained by alternative means
that are less destructive of First Amendment rights, and (3) demonstrate a
compelling and overriding interest in the information.4 7 That formulation has
had a remarkable impact upon the development of the law defining the re-
porter's privilege and its contours. It has influenced the recognition of the
privilege by a majority of federal courts of appeals4 8 and the appellate courts
43. Id.
44. Id. (quoting Justice Stewart's dissent).
45. Id. at 710.
46. Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 743 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
47. Id.
48. See, e.g., In re Madden, 151 F.3d 125, 128-29 (3d Cir. 1998); Shoen v. Shoen, 5
F.3d 1289 (9th Cir. 1993); United States v. Caporale, 806 F.2d 1487 (11 th Cir. 1986), cert.
denied, 483 U.S. 1021 (1987); LaRouche v. Nat'l Broad. Co., 780 F.2d 1134, 1139 (4th Cir.
1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 818 (1986); United States v. Burke, 700 F.2d 70, 77 (2d Cir.
2006]
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of at least nine states.49 Other states adopting the privilege have used Justice
Powell's concurring opinion for guidance. 0
A noteworthy exception to the cases recognizing a qualified reporter's
privilege pursuant to Branzburg is a breezy opinion by Judge Richard Pos-
ner for a panel of the Seventh Circuit in McKevitt v. Pallasch,5" a case that
was decided in 2003. The facts in McKevitt were beyond the traditional
boundaries of Branzburg." A defendant in a prosecution in Ireland sought
an order from a United States district court requiring journalists in America
to turn over to him tape recordings of non-confidential interviews that a
primary witness for the prosecution had given to the journalists. 3 The jour-
nalists resisted the order out of concern that the defendant would be appro-
priating their intellectual property. 4 United States district courts are author-
ized to order production of non-privileged evidence for use in foreign
courts. 5 The witness who gave the interviews had no objection to their dis-
closure. 6 The journalists claimed that the taped interviews were subject to a
federal common law reporter's privilege."
Despite the difference from the factual situation in Branzburg, the
McKevitt panel seized the opportunity to take a position in the developing
jurisprudence on the issue of a reporter's privilege. The court held that sub-
poenas duces tecum to reporters should be judged by what is reasonable in
the circumstances, just as other subpoenas are judged,58 and it criticized
1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 816 (1983); Zerrilli v. Smith, 656 F.2d 705 (D.C. Cir. 1981);
Miller v. Transamerican Press, Inc., 621 F.2d 721 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S.
1041 (1981); Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 563 F.2d 433, 438 (10th Cir. 1977); Cervantes
v. Time, 464 F.2d 986 (8th Cir. 1972). But cf In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum, 112
F.3d 910 n.8 (8th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 521 U.S. 1105 (1997).
49. State v. Salsbury, 924 P.2d 208 (Idaho 1996) (declining to use the Stewart test but
stating that it would be applicable in certain cases); N.H. v. Siel, 444 A.2d 499 (N.H. 1992);
In re Letellier, 578 A.2d 722 (Me. 1990); State ex rel. Hudok v. Henry, 389 S.E.2d 188 (W.
Va. 1989); Los Angeles Mem'l Coliseum Comm'n v. Nat'l Football League, 89 F.R.D. 489
(C.D. Cal. 1981); State v. Sandstrom, 581 P.2d 812 (Kan. 1978), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 905
(1978); Winegard v. Oxberger, 258 N.W.2d 847 (Iowa 1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 905;
Morgan v. State, 337 So. 2d 951 (Fla. 1976); State v. St. Peter, 315 A.2d 254 (Vt. 1974).
50. See, e.g., Salsbury, 924 P.2d 208; State ex rel. Nat'l Broad. Co. v. Ct. of Common
Pleas, 556 N.E.2d 1120 (Ohio 1990); Ex parte Grothe, 687 S.W.2d 736 (Tex. Crim. App.
1984). Many states have enacted shield statutes derived from Justice Stewart's test. William
E. Lee, The Priestly Class: Reflections on a Journalist's Privilege, 23 CARDoZO ARTS & ENT.
L.J. 635, 666 (2006).
51. 339 F.3d 530 (7th Cir. 2003).
52. Id at 531.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 533-34.
55. 28 U.S.C. § 1782(a) (2006).
56. McKevitt, 339 F.3d at 532.
57. Id at 531.
58. Id at 533.
[Vol. 29
REPORTER'S PRIVILEGE
opinions from the First, Second, Third, Fourth, Fifth, Ninth, and Eleventh
Circuits that recognized some form of a reporter's privilege. 9 The Seventh
Circuit "do[es] not see why there needs to be special criteria merely because
the possessor of the documents or other evidence sought is a journalist."'6
Recognizing the harm that blind enforcement of that doctrine could cause,
the opinion quoted from the majority opinion in Branzburg that "[o]fficial
harassment of the press undertaken not for purposes of law enforcement but
to disrupt a reporter's relationship with his news sources would have no
justification."61
Because of its author's prominence and the subject's timeliness, the
opinion in McKevitt has received more attention than is usually accorded to
circuit court opinions at odds with what appears to be the weight of author-
ity on a given issue.2 Whether the opinion is sufficient to retard what ap-
pears to be a growing consensus in federal and state courts to recognize a
qualified reporter's privilege-in most cases connected to the First Amend-
ment with appropriate respect for the majority and concurring opinions and
Stewart's dissenting opinion in Branzburg-remains to be seen.63 What is
clear is that Judge Posner's opinion has invigorated the debate.'
IV. CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS IN ARKANSAS
The Arkansas Supreme Court has not addressed the issue of a re-
porter's privilege since its decision in Saxton in 1978. Some Arkansas cir-
cuit courts, however, have recognized the privilege. In State v. Echols65 in
the Circuit Court of Craighead County, Arkansas, the defendant subpoenaed
Creative Thinking International, Inc. and Home Box Office to acquire the
59. Id. at 532.
60. Id. at 533.
61. Id. (quoting Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 707-08 (1972)).
62. Kara A. Lawson, The Demise of the First Amendment-Based Reporter's Privilege:
Why This Current Trend Should Not Surprise the Media, 37 CONN. L. REv. 1235, 1252-54
(2005); Jaynie Randall, Freeing Newsgatheringfrom the Reporter's Privilege, 114 YALE L.J.
1827 (2005); Erik W. Laursen, Putting Journalists on Thin Ice: McKevitt v. Pallasch, 73
CONN. L REv. 293 (2004); Heather Stamp, McKevitt v. Pallasch: How the Ghosts of the
Branzburg Decision Are Haunting Journalists in the Seventh Circuit, 14 DEPAUL-LCA J. ART
& ENT. L. & POL'Y 363 (2004).
63. The Second Circuit did not even cite McKevitt in its opinion holding that the gov-
ernment was entitled to seize reporters' telephone records in a criminal investigation. The
court applied Branzburg in recognizing a qualified reporter's privilege, but it declined to
determine its precise contours in The New York Times Co. v. Gonzales, 459 F.3d 160, 163 (2d
Cir. 2006). The First Circuit acknowledged the limitations that McKevitt would place upon
Branzburg but held that cases in the First Circuit were "in principle somewhat more protec-
tive." In re Special Proceedings, 373 F.3d 37 (1st Cir. 2004).
64. See, e.g., Jeffrey Toobin, Name That Source, THE NEW YORKER, Jan. 15, 2006, at 30.
65. No. CR 93-450A (Cir. Ct. of Craighead County, Ark. filed Mar. 11, 1994).
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audio portion of an interview with a separate murder suspect, Charles Jason
Baldwin.66 The circuit court67 entered an order declaring that the First
Amendment creates a qualified privilege in favor of the press engaged in the
news-gathering process.68 The court found that the defendant had not suffi-
ciently shown that the materials sought by the subpoena were relevant or
that the information could not be obtained from alternative sources. 69 The
circuit court granted the journalist's motion to quash.7"
In December 1994, in the Pulaski County Circuit Court case First
Commercial Trust v. Aldridge,7' the defendant Aldridge served a subpoena
on reporters at the Arkansas Democrat-Gazette, seeking information ob-
tained in their news-gathering activities.7' The Honorable Chris Piazza en-
tered an order upholding the First Amendment creation of a qualified privi-
lege in favor of the press, and he found that Aldridge failed to show that the
requested information was not available through less-intrusive means.73 The
court quashed the subpoenas. 74 In State v. Bernard,75 also in the Circuit
Court of Pulaski County, Judge Piazza made the same findings and quashed
a subpoena served on a reporter for the Arkansas Democrat-Gazette.6 In all
three of these Arkansas circuit court cases, the courts applied the three-part
balancing test articulated in Justice Stewart's dissent in Branzburg, and the
courts recognized the qualified privilege as existing under Article 2, Section
6 of the Arkansas Constitution as well as the First Amendment to the Con-
stitution of the United States.
In a 1996 federal court case in Arkansas, American Broadcasting
Companies, Inc.77 sought to quash a grand jury subpoena seeking a full tran-
script and videotape of an interview conducted by ABC News of Susan
McDougal, a figure in the Whitewater investigation conducted by Independ-
ent Counsel Kenneth Starr.78 One of ABC's arguments in favor of quashing
the subpoena was that the segments of the videotape that were not broadcast
66. Order at 1, State v. Echols, No. CR 93-450A (Cir. Ct. of Craighead County, Ark.
Mar. 11, 1994).
67. The Honorable C. David Burnett.
68. Order, supra note 66, at 1.
69. Id. at 2.
70. Id.
71. No. 94-3006 (Cir. Ct. of Pulaski County, Ark. filed Dec. 12, 1994).
72. See Order at 1, First Commercial Trust v. Aldridge, No. 94-3006 (Cir. Ct. of Pulaski
County, Ark. Dec. 12, 1994).
73. Id. at 1-2.
74. Id. at 2.
75. No. 94-2133 (Cir. Ct. of Pulaski County, Ark. filed Feb. 21, 1995).
76. See Order at 1-2, State v. Bernard, No. 94-2133 (Cir. Ct. of Pulaski County, Ark.
Feb. 21, 1995).
77. In re Grand Jury Subpoena Am. Broad. Co., 947 F. Supp. 1314 (E.D. Ark. 1996).
78. Id. at 1316-17.
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were protected from disclosure by the journalist's qualified privilege under
the First Amendment.79 Further, ABC argued that the segments should not
be produced unless the Independent Counsel could demonstrate that (1) the
information sought was highly relevant, (2) it was not reasonably available
from other sources, and (3) the Independent Counsel had an overriding need
for the information.8"
The court denied the motion to quash." The district judge, the Honor-
able Susan Webber Wright, acknowledged that a number of federal courts
have recognized a journalist's privilege, requiring a three-part test, but noted
that the majority of those cases were decided in a civil context, and she de-
clined to apply the three-part test in a grand jury setting.82 In doing so, how-
ever, the court went on to say that even if it were to adopt the test urged by
ABC, the court would deny the motion. 83 The opinion then carefully consid-
ered and rejected ABC's arguments on each of the three parts of the test.84
In 2002, another federal case in Arkansas, United States v. Hively,85
addressed the issue of a reporter's privilege in the context of a criminal trial.
A reporter, and the newspaper for which she worked, moved to quash a sub-
poena that ordered the reporter to appear and testify in the defendant's
case. 86 The courts' noted that the information sought by the defendant was
not confidential, that the testimony sought was narrowly focused, and that
the reporter was not asked to turn over notes or other unpublished materi-
als.88 Pointedly limiting its ruling to the specific facts before it, and noting
the absence of evidence that the information was sought in bad faith or for
purposes of harassment, the court declined to recognize any constitutional
privilege protecting non-confidential testimony from the reporter. 9
As we have seen, the development of federal law in civil cases has
generally favored recognition of a qualified reporter's privilege, but the
status of the reporter's privilege is not as clear in the Eighth Circuit. A 1997
panel opinion of the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit9
has been cited for the proposition that the Eighth Circuit has not yet ruled on
79. Id. at 1317.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 1322.
82. Id. at 1319.
83. In re Grand Jury Subpoena Am. Broad. Co., 947 F. Supp. at 1320.
84. Id. at 1320-21.
85. 202 F. Supp. 2d 886 (E.D. Ark. 2002).
86. Id. at 887.
87. The Honorable James M. Moody.
88. Hively, 202 F. Supp. 2d at 888.
89. Id. at 892.
90. In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum, 112 F.3d 910, 918 n.8 (8th Cir. 1997),




the issue in a civil or criminal context,9' yet this statement is not free from
doubt. In Cervantes v. Time, Inc.,92 a libel case, the court held that summary
judgment was properly granted without requiring the media defendants, a
magazine and its reporter, to reveal the identity of confidential sources for
an article linking the plaintiff, the mayor of St. Louis, to organized crime.93
The plaintiff wanted to depose the sources in order to challenge the veracity
of the information supplied to the defendants.94 The court acknowledged the
majority decision in Branzburg that a journalist does not have a First A-
mendment privilege to refuse to answer proper questions in a grand jury's
investigation of a crime.95 The court also said that "[t]he [Branzburg] Court
was not faced with and, therefore, did not address, the question whether a
civil libel suit should command the quite different reconciliation of conflict-
ing interests pressed upon us here by the defense." 96
Cervantes was cited by the Ninth Circuit as supporting its finding in
Shoen v. Shoen97 of a qualified privilege for news reporters under
Branzburg.98 The basis of the view that the application of Branzburg to
criminal and civil cases is an open question in the Eighth Circuit is this
statement in the 1997 opinion: "Although the Ninth Circuit in Shoen cited
our opinion in Cervantes for support, we believe this question is an open one
in this Circuit." 99 The reason for the qualification is understandable in view
of the context of Cervantes, in which the court expressed doubt that the
same rule should apply to criminal and civil cases. The issue may still be
open in the Eighth Circuit, but it is not wide open. The reservation expressed
in Cervantes regarding the application of the majority opinion in Branzburg
to civil cases cannot and should not be disregarded lightly.
The first clear acknowledgement by a federal court in Arkansas of a
First Amendment qualified reporter's privilege in civil cases occurred in
2004 in an opinion on a motion to quash a deposition subpoena for a colum-
nist's testimony in Richardson v. Sugg.'00 The proposed findings and rec-
ommended disposition by United States Magistrate Judge John F. Forster,
Jr., which were adopted with a minor change by District Judge William R.
Wilson, Jr., contain the following paragraph after a detailed review of the
state of the law:
91. Richardson v. Sugg, 220 F.R.D. 343, 346 (E.D. Ark. 2004).
92. 464 F.2d 986 (8th Cir. 1972).
93. Id. at 994.
94. Id. at 991-92.
95. Id. at 993 n.9.
96. Id.
97. 5 F.3d 1280 (9th Cir. 1993).
98. Id. at 1292 n.5.
99. In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum, 112 F.3d 910, 918 n.8 (8th Cir. 1997)
(emphasis added).
100. 220 F.R.D. 343 (E.D. Ark. 2004).
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The Magistrate Judge finds that this Court should recognize, in accor-
dance with the weight of authority, a First Amendment qualified re-
porter's privilege in civil cases against compelled disclosure of the iden-
tity of the reporter's confidential sources and of information, both confi-
dential and non[-]confidential, gathered by the reporter in the news-
gathering process.''
The holding requires the application of the three-part test upon the as-
sertion of the privilege, noting that in the case of non-confidential informa-
tion, the claim of privilege can be overcome by a showing "that the materi-
als at issue are of likely relevance to a significant issue in the case and are
not reasonably obtainable from other available sources."' 12 The holding also
provides that a reporter subpoenaed for a deposition should "appear for the
deposition and assert his privileges in response to specific questions and
make at least a minimal prima facie showing as to why and how the privi-
lege is being properly invoked."'1 3
V. CONCLUSION
The Arkansas Supreme Court has yet to define the scope of the re-
porter's privilege. Guidance can be found in orders of lower courts in Ar-
kansas that have addressed the issue and from the thoughtful consideration
of the privilege in opinions of federal courts sitting in Arkansas, particularly
In re Grand Jury Subpoena ABC, Hively, and Richardson. In the thirty-four
years since the Court decided Branzburg, the state and federal judiciaries
have developed a jurisprudence on the issue that is variously drawn from the
majority opinion of Justice White, the concurring opinion of Justice Powell,
and the dissenting opinion of Justice Stewart. The judges of state and federal
courts found good sense and sound legal reasoning in all three of those opin-
ions, and the reporter's privilege is recognized in most of the federal circuits
and in most of the states. It is telling that many of the state legislatures that
have adopted a reporter's shield statute since Branzburg have found guid-
ance in Justice Stewart's dissenting opinion. It is unlikely that Judge Pos-
ner's opinion in McKevitt will result in the dismantling of the jurisprudence
that has been developing for more than three decades. There is just too much
history.
The overarching idea of freedom of the press should not be obscured
by a concern that is miscast as granting journalists special privileges that
ordinary citizens do not have. The point is that the news-gathering process
should be appropriately protected so that the public can be informed in order
101. Id. at 347.




to be better equipped for the daunting task of self-governance. At the end of
the day, as one Supreme Court justice has reminded us in expressing this
view, it is the right of the public, not the right of the media, that is para-
mount. 104
104. Justice David H. Souter dissenting in Cowen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663,
678 (1991) (citing CBS, Inc. v. F.C.C., 453 U.S. 367 (1981)).
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